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Abstract—This paper proposes a bi-level optimization frame-
work to coordinate the operation of price-maker battery energy
storage systems (BESSs) in real-time energy, reserve, and pay as
performance regulation markets. The framework models both
BESS’s bidding strategies and the system operator’s market
clearing process, which makes it possible to assess the optimal
allocation of BESS’s services across various markets and study
the impact of BESS’s operation on energy and ancillary services
markets. The BESS’s strategic biding model is equipped with an
accurate degradation cost function for the batteries. Based upon
a comprehensive model for the frequency regulation market,
an automatic generation control (AGC) signal dispatch model
is proposed to deploy AGC signals in the bi-level framework.
This enables detailed studies for BESS’s operating patterns in
the frequency regulation market. Case studies using a synthetic
system built upon real-world data are performed to evaluate the
proposed framework and study the interactions between BESS’s
profit maximization activities and wholesale market operations.
Sensitivity studies are performed to investigate the impact of
BESS’s capacity and replacement cost on its revenue from energy
and ancillary services markets.
Index Terms—Battery energy storage system, price-maker,
electricity market, battery degradation cost, bi-level optimization
NOMENCLATURE
Sets and Indices
B Set of battery storage buses, indexed by i.
G Set of generator buses, indexed by j.
K Set of battery degradation cost curve segments,
indexed by k.
L Set of transmission lines, indexed by (n,w).
N Set of all buses, indexed by n and w.
T Set of market clearing intervals, indexed by t.
Z Set of AGC signal sub-invervals, indexed by z.
B Superscript for battery energy storage units.
Ch,Dis Superscript for charge and discharge power of
each degradation segment.
E Superscript for the energy market.
G Superscript for generators.
RgC Superscript for the regulation capacity market.
RgM Superscript for the regulation mileage market.
Rs Superscript for the reserve market.
TCh, TDis Superscript for total charge and discharge power
in each sub-interval.
Parameters and Constants
α Generator price offer.
t¯, z¯ The last interval and the last sub-interval.
∆t,∆z Interval and sub-interval time spans.
η Battery unit’s charge/discharge efficiency.
AGC Automatic generation control signal set points.
CDeg Slope of each degradation cost segment.
eMax Each degradation cost segment’s capacity limit.
H Transmission line susceptance.
m Regulation mileage multiplier.
PLoad System real power load.
PMin, PMax Generator output power limit.
PRate Battery unit’s charge/discharge limit.
PRg,Ramp Ramp limit for generator regulation provision.
PRs,Ramp Ramp limit for generator reserve provision.
R System requirements for ancillary services.
SOCInit Battery unit’s initial state of charge.
SOCMax Battery unit’s maximum state of charge.
SOCMin Battery unit’s minimum state of charge.
TL Transmission line thermal limit.
Variables
β Price offer of battery units.
pi Market clearing prices.
θ Bus voltage angles.
e Energy stored during each degradation segment.
P Real power.
PF Regulation market participation factor.
Q Quantity offer of battery units.
v Sub-interval charge/discharge indicator.
I. INTRODUCTION
BATTERY energy storage systems (BESSs) have variouspower grid applications, including energy arbitrage, fre-
quency regulation, transmission deferral, demand-side man-
agement, and peak shaving. Recognizing BESS’s capability of
multiple services provision, the US Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) issued several orders (755 and 841),
encouraging BESSs to participate in various markets [1],
[2]. These factors have stimulated the market participation of
merchant BESSs, and inspired researchers to study the optimal
scheduling of merchant BESSs and the impact of BESSs’
profit maximization activities on market operations.
To study the impact of merchant BESS’s profit maxi-
mization activities on independent system operator’s (ISO’s)
joint market clearing outcomes, existing literature models the
BESS as a price-maker or strategic participant in energy and
ancillary services markets, considering utility-scale BESS’s
capacity and capabilities of multiple services provision [3]–
[6]. The BESS’s profit maximization problem is modeled using
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2a bi-level optimization framework, which considers both the
BESS’s strategic bidding problem and the BESS’s impact on
wholesale market operations. Reference [7] proposes a price-
maker model to study the participation of grid-scale energy
storage in the energy market with high wind penetration.
Reference [8] constructs a Nash-Cournot equilibrium model
to study strategic interactions between various generation re-
sources and energy storage fleets. The performance of various
market mechanisms in the existence of a utility-scale BESS is
evaluated in [3]. The coordination of a price-maker BESS in
the day-ahead energy market is investigated in [4]. Although
the work in [4] does not model ancillary services markets that
are usually more appealing for BESSs, it performs a com-
prehensive analysis of the market outcome and BESS’s profit
under various conditions. The participation of a price-maker
BESS in the day-ahead energy and reserve markets along with
the real-time balancing market is discussed in [5]. Considering
day-ahead reserve and real-time balancing markets in this
paper makes the analysis more accurate and closer to the real
opportunities that price-maker BESSs may have. However, this
work does not model the frequency regulation market, which
could result in inaccurate assessments of BESSs’ capability
of multiple services provision and total profit obtained from
multiple markets. In [6], the BESS is modeled as a price-
taker in the energy market and a price-maker in ancillary
services markets, in which parameter uncertainties are also
considered. Instead of solving a bi-level optimization, this
work captures the impact of BESS on the ancillary services
markets by predicting a price quota curve. Although the model
in [6] is comprehensive with various details of BESS and
markets operations, this model does not capture the correla-
tions between energy and ancillary services markets, therefore
could not adequately represent BESS’s impact on ISO’s joint
market clearing. Furthermore, the battery degradation cost is
not modeled in [6], which prevents this work from obtaining
realistic results on BESS’s market performance.
This paper proposes a comprehensive framework for analyz-
ing the interactions between the price-maker BESS’s strategic
bidding activities and the ISO’s joint market clearing process
across real-time energy, spinning reserve, and pay as perfor-
mance regulation markets. This model is developed upon our
previous work [9], in which a simplified model is proposed.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• The strategic bidding problem for a price-maker BESS
in real-time energy, spinning reserve, and pay as perfor-
mance regulation markets is formulated as a bi-level op-
timization problem while considering BESS’s operational
details and ISO’s market clearing models.
• Existing works on price-maker BESSs do not consider
accurate battery degradation cost models. A realistic
degradation cost function is deployed in this work to
perform an accurate analysis.
• The impact of BESS’s AGC signal following activities on
its revenue and operating patterns across multiple markets
is not fully explored in existing works. To perform these
studies, an AGC signal dispatch model is proposed to
deploy AGC signals in the bi-level framework based on
market outcomes.
• BESS’s operating patterns across energy and ancillary
services markets as well as the impact of BESS’s profit
maximization activities on wholesale market operations
are analyzed using a synthetic test case with real-world
data for market parameters and BESS parameters.
• A bi-parametric sensitivity analysis is performed to study
the impacts of battery capacity and replacement cost
on the BESS owner’s total revenue and revenue from
different markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the proposed bi-level framework for modeling both
the price-maker BESS’s profit maximization and ISO’s joint
market clearing. Section III presents the simulation procedure
and case study results. Section IV concludes the paper.
II. FORMULATION AND METHODOLOGY
This section formulates the bi-level framework for the
interactions between a merchant price-maker BESS’s profit
maximization and ISO’s joint market clearing. This framework
contains the upper-level problem (ULP) and the lower-level
problem (LLP). The ULP maximizes BESS’s total profit across
various markets. The LLP simulates ISO’s market clearing
process and minimizes the joint operating costs of the three
markets. The ULP and LLP are coupled together. Decision
variables of the ULP, including BESS’s quantity and price
offers, serve as the input parameters for the LLP. The BESS’s
market clearing prices (MCPs) and scheduled power, deter-
mined by the LLP, serve as input parameters for the ULP.
Detailed ULP and LLP formulations are presented below.
A. The Upper-level Problem (ULP) Formulation
In the ULP, the BESS owner with several battery storage
units at different buses maximizes its revenue from the real-
time energy, spinning reserve, and pay as performance regula-
tion markets while considering its operating limits and battery
degradation cost. Equations (U1)-(U20) represent the ULP.
Max
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈B
{[
piEi,tP
B,E
i,t + pi
Rs
t P
B,Rs
i,t + pi
RgC
t P
B,RgC
i,t +
piRgMt P
B,RgM
i,t
]
∆t−
∑
z∈Z
∑
k∈K
CDegi,k P
Dis
i,t,z,k∆z
}
(U1)
Subject to:
− PRatei ≤ QEi,t ≤ PRatei ∀i ∈ B,∀t ∈ T (U2)
0 ≤ QRsi,t ≤ PRatei ∀i ∈ B,∀t ∈ T (U3)
0 ≤ QRgCi,t ≤ PRatei ∀i ∈ B,∀t ∈ T (U4)
− PRatei + PB,RgCi,t ≤ PB,Ei,t ≤ PRatei − PB,RgCi,t − PB,Rsi,t
∀i ∈ B,∀t ∈ T (U5)
PFi,t =
PB,RgMi,t
RRgMt
∀i ∈ B,∀t ∈ T (U6)∑
i∈B
PFi,t ≤ 1 ∀t ∈ T (U7)
RRgMt =
∑
z
|AGCt,z −AGCt,z−1| ∀t ∈ T ,∀z ∈ Z (U8)
3PB,Ei,t + PFi,tAGCt,z = P
TDis
i,t,z − PTChi,t,z
∀i ∈ B,∀t ∈ T ,∀z ∈ Z (U9)
0 ≤ PTDisi,t,z ≤ vi,t,zPRatei ∀i ∈ B,∀t ∈ T ,∀z ∈ Z (U10)
0 ≤ PTChi,t,z ≤ (1− vi,t,z)PRatei
∀i ∈ B,∀t ∈ T ,∀z ∈ Z (U11)
PTDisi,t,z (
1
ηi
) =
∑
k∈K
PDisi,t,z,k ∀i ∈ B,∀t ∈ T ,∀z ∈ Z (U12)
PTChi,t,z ηi =
∑
k∈K
PChi,t,z,k ∀i ∈ B,∀t ∈ T ,∀z ∈ Z (U13)
PChi,t,z,k, P
Dis
i,t,z,k ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ B,∀t ∈ T ,∀z ∈ Z,∀k ∈ K (U14)
ei,t,z,k − ei,t,z−1,k = (PChi,t,z,k − PDisi,t,z,k)∆z
∀i ∈ B,∀t ∈ T ,∀z 6= 1 ∈ Z,∀k ∈ K (U15)
ei,t,z,k − ei,t−1,z¯,k = (PChi,t,z,k − PDisi,t,z,k)∆z
∀i ∈ B,∀t ∈ T , τ = 1,∀k ∈ K (U16)
0 ≤ ei,t,z,k ≤ eMaxi,k ∀i ∈ B,∀t ∈ T ,∀z ∈ Z,∀k ∈ K (U17)
SOCMini + (P
B,Rs
i,t ∆t) ≤
∑
k∈K
ei,t,z,k ≤ SOCMaxi
∀i ∈ B,∀t ∈ T ,∀z ∈ Z (U18)∑
k∈K
ei,t,z,k = SOC
Init
i
∀i ∈ B, t = 0 & z = z¯, t = t¯& z = z¯ (U19)
vi,t,z ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ B,∀t ∈ T ,∀z ∈ Z (U20)
The objective function, decision variables, and BESS oper-
ating constraints of the ULP are described below.
1) The Objective Function (U1) and Decision Variables:
The objective function (U1) maximizes the total revenue
of a BESS owner (with multiple battery units at different
buses) over a certain time period. In (U1), the total revenue
is the addition/subtraction of the following five revenue/cost
components: 1) BESS’ net revenue for selling/buying energy
in the real-time energy market; 2) BESS’s revenue for spinning
reserve provision; 3) BESS’s revenue for regulation capacity
provision; 4) BESS’s revenue for regulation mileage provi-
sion; 5) BESS’s degradation cost, respectively. The decision
variables of the ULP include each battery unit’s price and
quantity offers for real-time energy, reserve capacity, regula-
tion capacity, and regulation mileage provisions, during every
market clearing interval t. These offers serve as inputs for
ISO’s joint market clearing process in the LLP.
2) Constraints (U2)-(U5) for Battery Units’
Charge/Discharge Limit: During each market clearing
interval t, Constraints (U2) and (U3) limit the quantity offers
of each battery unit i for energy market participation and
reserve capacity provision within the unit’s charge/discharge
rate, respectively. In (U2), the battery unit’s quantity offer for
energy market participation can be positive or negative. This
corresponds to the fact that the battery unit could discharge
(i.e., sell energy) or charge (i.e., buy energy) during each
market clearing interval. It should be noted that this work
assumes the real-time spinning reserve market to be an
upward-only market. It is not usual to consider a downward
reserve market, which is similar to the upward reserve market
and can be handled by the proposed framework with minor
adjustments. Additionally, the deployment of spinning reserve
product is not modeled in this formulation, since reserve
deployments are usually considered during contingencies,
which falls out of the scope of this work.
The real-time pay as performance regulation market model
of this paper is similar to the model proposed in [10]. Both
up-ward and down-ward regulation markets are modeled. This
regulation market model shares similar characteristics with
that in California ISO. The regulation market model contains
two separate payment components for regulation capacity and
regulation mileage provisions. During each market clearing
interval t, Constraint (U4) limits the quantity offer of each
battery unit i for regulation capacity provision within the
unit’s charge/discharge rate. Constraint (U5) indicates for
each battery unit i, the total power scheduled for energy,
reserve capacity, and regulation capacity provisions during
each market clearing interval t must stay below the unit’s
charge/discharge rate.
3) Constraints (U6)-(U8) for AGC Dispatching: In pay
as performance regulation markets, the regulation mileage
payments compensate battery units and other regulating units
for every megawatt deployed toward following the system-
level AGC signal sent out by ISOs continuously (every four
seconds). In ISO practice, this system-level AGC signal is
dispatched to each regulation market participant, based on the
participant’s awarded regulation mileage within each market
clearing interval. The regulation market participants then fol-
low these dispatched AGC signals (i.e., the unit-level AGC
signals) for regulation mileage provision. To accurately repre-
sent BESS’s AGC signal following activities in the proposed
bi-level framework, the unit-level AGC signal dispatched to
each battery unit needs to be properly modeled. In this paper,
a participation factor (PF) is defined using (U6)-(U8), for
simulating the AGC signal dispatch process and obtaining the
unit-level AGC signal for every battery unit. The proposed PF
and the AGC signal dispatch simulation enable us to perform
detailed studies on the impact of BESS’s AGC signal following
activities on its state of charge (SOC) management and overall
behavior across energy and ancillary services markets.
In (U6), the PF for each battery unit is defined as the ratio
of the battery unit’s scheduled power for regulation mileage
provision to the system-level total regulation mileage require-
ment within each market clearing interval. The summation of
PFs for all the battery units should not go beyond 1 (i.e., 100%
of the system-level total regulation mileage requirement), as
described in (U7). In (U8), the system-level total regulation
mileage requirement for a certain market clearing interval is
defined by accumulating the differences between two system-
level AGC signal setpoints obtained at adjacent AGC sub-
intervals within the same market clearing interval. These PFs
are then used to calculate the regulation mileage payments
to various battery units during each market clearing interval
(i.e., the BESS’s revenue for regulation mileage provision in
the objective function). PFs are also used for calculating the
amount of charged/discharged power of each unit in each sub-
interval by Constraint (U9). In this paper, we assume the
BESS can follow AGC signals with perfect accuracy, since
most BESSs are inverter-based resources whose power outputs
can be adjusted with little delay. Therefore, the regulation
4mileage payments calculated above do not include penalties
for inaccurate performance in tracing AGC signals.
4) Constraints (U9)-(U17) for Battery Degradation Cost:
In this paper, we integrate a modified version of the degrada-
tion cost model proposed in [11] into our bi-level framework.
This degradation cost model calculates the battery degradation
cost using a linear approximation of the rainflow algorithm.
The rainflow algorithm counts the number of charge/discharge
cycles of batteries and associates a specific capacity degra-
dation value to each cycle based on the depth of the cycle
(i.e., cycle depth). In this degradation cost model, the battery
capacity (from 0% to 100%) is uniformly divided into several
segments (i.e., the degradation segments) represented by the
K set. The energy capacity limit of each segment eMax is a
portion of the battery capacity. A piecewise linear approxima-
tion of the degradation cost (obtained from the battery cycle
depth aging function) is assigned to each segment CDeg. In our
formulation, the degradation cost is calculated in each AGC
signal sub-interval. Therefore, the degradation cost caused by
following AGC signal and/or participating in energy market
is considered. More details on this degradation cost model
can be found in [11], [12]. In the objective function (U1),
the BESS’s total degradation cost (obtained from the above
model) is subtracted from its revenue components.
During a certain AGC signal sub-interval, Constraints (U9)-
(U11) determine the charging/discharging state of each battery
unit by considering the battery’s power scheduled for both
energy and regulation mileage provisions. Constraints (U12)-
(U14) assign the battery charge and discharge power during
each AGC signal sub-interval to the corresponding degradation
segments, while the battery’s charge/discharge efficiency is
considered. Constraints (U15)-(U16) evaluate the battery’s
stored energy in each degradation segment, by comparing
the difference between the stored energy in two consecutive
AGC signal sub-intervals. Constraint (U15) performs this
comparison for consecutive sub-intervals within the same
market clearing interval, while Constraint (U16) performs
this comparison between the first sub-interval of each market
clearing interval and the last sub-interval of the previous
market clearing interval. Constraint (U17) enforces the energy
capacity limits of the degradation segments.
The above degradation cost representation (in (U1) and
(U9)-U(17)) indicates in each AGC signal sub-interval, 1) if
the battery unit is charging, the charged energy is allocated
to the degradation segment with the lowest degradation cost
which has not yet reached its maximum energy limit; 2) if the
battery unit is discharging, the discharged energy is subtracted
from the degradation segment with the lowest degradation cost
which has been charged previously.
5) Constraints (U18)-(U20) for Battery SOC Management:
For each battery unit, Constraint (U18) limits its total energy
stored during every AGC signal dispatching sub-interval using
the unit’s maximum and minimum SOCs. In (U18), enough
battery capacity is reserved for up-ward spinning reserve
provision. Constraint (U19) ensures, for each battery unit, the
SOCs at the beginning and end of the simulation horizon
remain at the same pre-specified value, so it is possible to
expand a short-time simulation result to a longer period.
Constraint (U20) defines the binary variables representing each
battery unit’s charging/discharging states during different AGC
signal sub-intervals.
B. The Lower-level Problem (LLP) Formulation
The LLP describes the joint market-clearing process for
ISO’s real-time energy, reserve, and regulation markets. Equa-
tions (L1)-(L14) below represent the LLP.
Min
∑
t∈T
[∑
j∈G
(
αSj,tP
G,S
j,t + α
Rs
j,tP
G,Rs
j,t + α
RgC
j,t P
G,RgC
j,t +
αRgMj,t P
G,RgM
j,t
)
+
∑
i∈B
(
βEi,tP
B,E
i,t + β
Rs
i,t P
B,Rs
i,t +
βRgCi,t P
B,RgC
i,t + β
RgM
i,t P
B,RgM
i,t
)]
∆t (L1)
Subject to:
PMinj + P
G,RgC
j,t ≤ PG,Sj,t ≤ PMaxj − PG,Rsj,t − PG,RgCj,t
∀j ∈ G,∀t ∈ T (L2)
0 ≤ PG,Rsj,t ≤ PRs,ramp ∀j ∈ G,∀t ∈ T (L3)
0 ≤ PG,RgCj,t ≤ PRg,ramp ∀j ∈ G,∀t ∈ T (L4)
PG,RgCj,t ≤ PG,RgMj,t ≤ mj,tPG,RgCj,t ∀j ∈ G,∀t ∈ T (L5)
−QEi,t ≤ PB,Ei,t ≤ QEi,t ∀i ∈ B,∀t ∈ T (L6)
0 ≤ PB,Rsi,t ≤ QRsi,t ∀i ∈ B,∀t ∈ T (L7)
0 ≤ PB,RgCi,t ≤ QRgCi,t ∀i ∈ B,∀t ∈ T (L8)
PB,RgCi,t ≤ PB,RgMi,t ≤ mi,tPB,RgCi,t ∀i ∈ B,∀t ∈ T (L9)∑
j∈G
PG,Rsj,t +
∑
i∈B
PB,Rsi,t ≥ RRst : piRst ∀t ∈ T (L10)∑
j∈G
PG,RgCj,t +
∑
i∈B
PB,RgCi,t ≥ RRgCt : piRgCt ∀t ∈ T (L11)∑
j∈G
PG,RgMj,t +
∑
i∈B
PB,RgMi,t ≥ RRgMt : piRgMt
∀t ∈ T (L12)∑
j∈G|j=n
PG,Sj,t +
∑
i∈B|i=n
PB,Ei,t =
PLoadn,t +
∑
w∈N
Hnw(θn,t − θw,t) : piEn,t
∀n ∈ N ,∀t ∈ T (L13)
− TLnw ≤ Hnw(θn,t − θw,t) ≤ TLnw
∀(n,w) ∈ L,∀t ∈ T (L14)
The objective function, decision variables, and market op-
erating constraints of the LLP are described below.
1) The Objective Function (L1) and Decision Variables:
The objective function (L1) determines the total operating
cost of the system, considering energy and ancillary services
provision. The decision variables of the LLP include the sched-
uled power outputs of each generating unit and each battery
unit for energy, reserve, regulation capacity, and regulation
mileage provisions, during every market clearing interval. The
LLP also determines the energy, reserve, regulation capacity,
and regulation mileage prices for each battery unit. These
scheduled power outputs (for the battery units) and MCPs
serve as the inputs for the ULP.
52) Constraints (L2)-(L9) for Market Participants: Con-
straints (L2)-(L4) ensure for each generating unit, 1) its total
power delivery in each market clearing interval lies within its
maximum and minimum generation limits; 2) its reserve and
regulation capacity provisions at each market clearing interval
do not exceed the corresponding ramp rates. Constraints (L6)-
(L8) ensure the scheduled power outputs of each battery unit
in the energy, reserve, and regulation capacity markets lie
within the corresponding quantity offers submitted by the
BESS (determined by the ULP).
Constraints (L5) and (L9) apply to each regulation market
participant (including the BESS’s units and generating units)
to represent the pay as performance market model. In these
constraints, the regulation mileage multiplier m is assigned
by the ISO to each regulating unit based on its historical per-
formance on regulation mileage provision. These multipliers
serve as parameters of the optimization problem.
To ensure the AGC signal dispatched to each regulating unit
(based on the participation factor PF ) does not go beyond
the unit’s scheduled power for regulation capacity provision
PRgC , we scale each unit’s regulation mileage multiplier m
in a way that the inequality in (1) always holds.
mn,t <
RRgMt
Maxz(|AGCt,z −AGCt,z−1|)
∀n ∈ B ∪ G,∀t ∈ T (1)
With (1), during each market clearing interval, the regulation
multiplier of each regulating unit is scaled to be less than
the ratio of the system regulation mileage requirement to the
maximum change between consecutive AGC signal setpoints.
In (L5) and (L9), the regulation mileage PRgM awarded to
each regulating unit is bounded by the unit’s scheduled power
for regulation capacity provision PRgC , considering the unit’s
historical performance on regulation mileage provision (via
the regulation mileage multiplier m). In this regulation market
model, the regulating units only submit price offers (without
quantity offers) for regulation mileage provisions, since the
awarded regulation mileage PRgM is determined by the ISO
without considering regulation mileage quantity offers.
3) Constraints (L10)-(L12) for Market Operations: Con-
straints (L10)-(L12) ensure system requirements on reserve,
regulation capacity, and regulation mileage services are sat-
isfied at each market clearing interval. The dual variables of
these constraints piRst , pi
RgC
t , pi
RgM
t represent the MCPs for
the corresponding services. Constraint (L13) represents the
system-wide power balance relationship. Its dual variable piEn,t
represents the locational marginal price (LMP) at bus n. The
above MCPs and LMPs serve as inputs for the ULP. Constraint
(L14) represents the transmission line thermal limits.
C. The Solution Procedure
The proposed bi-level optimization is a nonlinear and non-
convex problem. It is converted to a mix integer linear pro-
gramming (MILP), whose optimal solution can be obtained
using commercial solvers. Details of the conversion process
for this type of problems can be found in [13].
III. CASE STUDIES
In this section, numerical studies are performed to evaluate
the performance of the proposed framework, investigate the
behavior of a price-maker BESS across multiple markets,
study BESS’s impacts on joint market operations, and analyze
the sensitivities of critical parameters on the study results.
A. The Test System
This work applies synthetic data with real-world sys-
tem/market information for performing simulations. The latest
update of IEEE’s reliability test system (RTS), i.e., the RTS-
Grid Modernization Laboratory Consortium (RTS-GMLC), is
adopted as the test system [14]. In this work, we perform
simulations on the third area of RTS-GMLC, which consists
of 25 buses, 39 transmission lines, 26 generators, and a
BESS owner with one utility-scale battery unit. The simulation
horizon is 24 hours with 96 market clearing intervals. The
length of each market clearing interval is 15 minutes. To
reduce computational burden for the simulations, the length of
the AGC signal dispatch sub-interval is set to be 20 seconds.
The average load of the third area in RTS-GLMC over the
summer period (June to August) is used to create the test
system load profile for the simulation horizon. The system
reserve and regulation capacity requirements are also obtained
using similar approaches. The system regulation mileage re-
quirement in each market clearing interval is set to be around
1.5 times the corresponding regulation capacity requirement,
which is a typical requirement for practical systems [10].
Fig. 1 shows system ancillary services requirements over the
24-hour horizon. It is observed that 1) for each market clearing
interval, the ratio between regulation mileage and capacity
requirements ranges from 1.35 to 1.65 (not strictly 1.5); 2) the
above ratio has an average value of 1.5 over the entire 24-hour
horizon. In this work, we assume the regulating units have
an acceptable historical performance for regulation mileage
provision. Therefore their regulation mileage multipliers m in
each market clearing interval is only limited by (1).
Fig. 1. The test system’s ancillary services requirements.
The sample AGC signals provided by ISO New England
(ISO-NE) are used for modeling AGC signals in this work
[15]. We modify the AGC signals to ensure the summation of
signal changes in each market clearing interval, calculated by
(U8), is equal to the system regulation mileage requirement
in that interval. AGC signals are dispatched every 20-second
6and also modified to have zero-mean in each market clearing
interval. Compared to non-zero-mean AGC signals, the zero-
mean AGC signals are more appealing for BESSs. ISOs like
PJM and ISO-NE offer zero-mean AGC signals to BESSs [16].
In this work, we assume the generators use their generation
costs as their price offers in the energy market. The generators’
synthetic price offers in the reserve and regulation markets are
created using historical ancillary services prices in PJM market
[17]. Extracted from PJM historical data, the average ratios
of the reserve price, regulation capacity price, and regulation
mileage price to the energy price are 0.15, 0.4, and 0.07,
respectively. Therefore, the generators’ energy price offers in
each market clearing interval are multiplied by 0.15, 0.4, and
0.07 to respectively create their price offers for the reserve,
regulation capacity, and regulation mileage services.
TABLE I
OPERATIONAL INFORMATION OF BESS’S UNIT
PRate Capacity SOCMin SOCMax SOCInit η
(MW) (MWh) (MWh) (MWh) (MWh) %
50 200 20 180 90 95
There is a lithium-ion BESS unit at Bus 13. Its operational
parameters are shown in Table I. This battery has a 4-hour
operation duration and an 80% maximum charge/discharge
cycle depth. This type of battery’s useful life is 6000 cycles at
80% charge/discharge cycle depth [18], and their replacement
cost is around 200 k$/MWh [19]. Based on the cycle depth
aging function of lithium-ion batteries [20] and the replace-
ment cost, the battery unit’s degradation cost function C(δ) is
represented as C(δ) = 52.4 δ2.03, where δ is the ratio of the
charge/discharge cycle depth to the battery capacity. This near
quadratic function is approximated by a 16-segment piecewise
linear function for degradation cost modeling.
B. Simulation Results
Simulation results for the above test system are discussed
below. Fig. 2 shows 1) the BESS’s total revenue from each
market and its degradation cost; 2) the system total operation
cost for each market, with or without BESS’s participation.
Four observations are made from Fig. 2.
First, although a price-maker BESS seeks to maximize its
own profit, its market participation still reduces the system
total operation cost and benefits the whole system.
Second, in this synthetic test system created with real-world
data, it is observed that the price-maker BESS performs price
manipulation in order to maximize its own profit. However,
these price manipulation activities are limited, and the BESS
with market power could still benefit the overall system
operation. For example, comparing the total operation cost of
the regulation capacity market and BESS’s revenue from this
market, it is clear that BESS is the major contributor to the
regulation capacity market. However, with the BESS, the total
operation cost of the regulation capacity market still reduces.
This indicates that, in this case, the BESS’s price manipulation
activities have a limited impact on raising the system-wide
market prices under the studied market structure. By further
improving the existing market structures and limiting BESS’s
price manipulation activities, system operators could gain
more benefits from BESS integration.
Third, in this simulation, almost all the BESS’s revenue
comes from the regulation capacity and mileage markets, in-
dicating regulation market being the most profitable market for
the BESS. This observation agrees with the BESS operating
patterns in real-world [21] and verifies the model accuracy.
Forth, the BESS collects the least revenue from the en-
ergy market. However, the total system operation cost of
the energy market still reduces after BESS’s participation in
various markets. It shows that BESS’s participation in the
ancillary services markets indirectly re-allocates the energy
and ancillary services provided by other generating units.
Fig. 2. System cost with/without BESS and BESS’s revenue and costs.
Fig. 3 shows the BESS’s scheduled power in each market
and its SOC across 24 hours (96 market clearing intervals).
By comparing the BESS’s scheduled power curves in Fig. 3
and the system-level ancillary services’ requirement curves in
Fig. 1, five observations are made.
First, in most market clearing intervals when the system
regulation capacity requirements are less than the battery
unit’s charging/discharging limit PRate, which is 50 MW in
this case; the system-level regulation requirements are fully
satisfied by regulation services from the BESS. This indicates,
compared to the energy and reserve markets, the regulation
market is the primary option for the BESS’s owner.
Second, during hours 6~8 and 10~18, the system regula-
tion capacity requirements exceed 50 MW (the battery unit’s
charging/discharging limit), and the BESS could not provide
all the regulation services required by the system. Under this
situation, the BESS’s scheduled power for regulation capacity
provision is mostly fixed at the 50 MW charging/discharging
limit, and the system regulation requirements are jointly sat-
isfied by both the BESS and other market participants.
Third, at the beginning and end of the day when the system
regulation capacity requirement does not exceed the 50 MW
charging/discharging limit, the BESS first provides all the
system’s regulation requirement, then optimally allocates its
unused output capacity across the other markets. Under this
situation, the BESS has more shares in the reserved market
than the energy market. Besides, during the charging periods,
the BESS performs energy arbitrage between the energy and
7reserve markets within the same market clearing interval. This
indicates the BESS sells a certain amount of energy it buys
from the energy market simultaneously into the reserve market.
As an example, in the ninth market clearing interval (around
the second hour), the BESS buys 6.8 MW from the energy
market and also sells 20.8 MW and 36 MW into the reserve
and regulation capacity markets, respectively. The total power
scheduled for ancillary services provision is 56.8 MW, which
exceeds the BESS’s 50 MW charging/discharging limit by 6.8
MW. This indicates if the BESS is called to provide 20.8 MW
reserve, 14 MW of the reserve deployment comes from the
BESS’s available output capacity, while the other 6.8 MW is
deployed by the BESS through not charging itself (i.e., not
buying/consuming energy).
Forth, the BESS also performs energy arbitrage between
different market clearing intervals. At the beginning of the day
when the energy prices are low, the BESS charges itself despite
its initial SOC is non-zero and can be used for energy/ancillary
services provision. This allows the BESS to avoid buying
energy (charging) during hours with high energy prices, while
compensating for the power discharged during the day and
maintaining the required SOC at the end of the day.
Fifth, the SOC curve in Fig. 3 shows in most market clearing
intervals, the BESS does not experience deep charge/discharge
cycles. The shallow charge/discharge cycles on the SOC curve
are caused by the BESS’s AGC signal following activities.
Since reducing charge/discharge cycle depth decreases the
BESS’s degradation cost, participating in the regulation market
could reduce the BESS’s degradation cost while maintaining
a certain revenue level. This justifies the low degradation
cost in Fig. 2. Additionally, the maximum and minimum
SOCs reached by the BESS lie around 102 MWh and 83
MWh, respectively. The maximum SOC difference is 19 MW,
which indicates the BESS uses only 10% of its 200 MWh
capacity during this 24-hour horizon. Therefore, a battery with
a similar charge/discharge limit but much less capacity could
gain similar profit with much less investment cost.
Fig. 3. Scheduled power of BESS in each market and its state of charge.
C. Analysis of the BESS’s Capacity and Degradation Cost
This section studies the impacts of the battery capacity and
replacement cost (modeled in the degradation cost function)
on the BESS owner’s operations and various markets’ revenue.
As the battery replacement cost is expected to reduce to less
than 70 k$/MWh by 2030 [22], and the battery capacity is
expected to further grow, these two parameters are critical for
evaluating BESS owner’s investment and operation decisions.
In this bi-parametric analysis, the capacity of the battery
unit is changed from 100 MWh to 2000 MWh with a 100
MWh step size. As the battery has a 4-hour operation duration,
its charge/discharge limit PRate also changes simultaneously
from 25 MW to 500 MW with a 25 MW step size. For
each size level, we consider 200 k$/MWh, 150 k$/MWh, 100
k$/MWh, 50 k$/MWh, 25 k$/MWh and 1 k$/MWh values
for replacement costs. The replacement cost variation leads to
variations in the degradation cost function C(δ). To maintain
the same accuracy in degradation cost modeling, the number of
degradation cost segments is also varied based on the changes
in battery capacity. We perform 120 simulations to cover the
above variations in the parameters. For each replacement cost,
the BESS’s total revenue and revenue from each market versus
its capacity (and corresponding PRate) are shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. BESS’s revenue versus its capacity and charge/discharge limit for
different replacement costs. The BESS’s total revenue and revenue from each
market are represented using curves with specific patterns, and each curve is
shown in different colors representing various battery replacement costs. For
example, the dotted black curve is the energy market revenue for a BESS with
1k$/MWh replacement cost. The horizontal axis is labeled with both BESS
capacity (in MWh) and charge/discharge limit (in MW).
In Fig. 4, except for the total revenue curve and the energy
market revenue curve obtained at the 1 k$/MWh replacement
cost, all the other revenue curves of the same pattern obtained
at different replacement costs overlap with each other. This
indicates reducing the battery replacement cost down to 25
k$/MWh does not affect the BESS’s revenue from each
market, while reducing the replacement cost further down to 1
k$/MWh increase the BESS’s revenue from the energy market.
In Fig. 4, the regulation market revenue curves obtained
at various battery replacement costs increase as the BESS
capacity increases up to 300 MWh. After the BESS ca-
pacity increases beyond 300 MWh (with the corresponding
75 MW charge/discharge limit), the system-level regulation
requirements are fully satisfied by the regulation services
provided by the BESS, indicating the regulation market being
8saturated by the BESS. Hence, the BESS’s regulation market
revenue curves are flat after the 300 MWh capacity. After
the saturation of the regulation market, increasing the BESS
capacity (from 300 MWh to 500 MWh) results in the growth of
its revenue from the reserve market. After the BESS capacity
increases beyond 500 MWh (with the corresponding 125 MW
charge/discharge limit), the system-level reserve requirements
are fully satisfied by the reserve services provided by the
BESSs. This reserve market saturation flattens the BESS’s
reserve market revenue curves after the 500 MWh capacity.
After the saturation of all the ancillary services markets, except
for the BESS’s total revenue curve obtained at the 1 k$/MWh
replacement cost, all the other total revenue curves obtained at
various battery replacement costs do not considerably increase
as the BESS capacity grows. This indicates for batteries with
25 k$/MWh and higher replacement costs, participating in the
energy market is not profitable for the BESS owner in this
case, due to the associated high degradation costs. For batteries
with 1 k$/MWh replacement costs, participating in the energy
market is profitable in this case since the degradation costs are
low. After the saturation of all the ancillary services markets,
the BESS allocates its unused capacity to the energy market.
Note that the BESS revenue curves for different markets have
different growth rates. For example, the growth rates of the
regulation market revenue curves (before saturation) are signif-
icantly larger than those of the energy market revenue curves.
This indicates the BESS’s capacity and charge/discharge limit
increment has more impact on its revenue from the regulation
market than that from the energy market.
The above results indicate: 1) compared to the energy
market, regulation and reserve markets are more profitable for
BESS owners, regardless of the battery replacement cost; 2)
the BESS’s revenue from the energy market depends on the
battery replacement cost and could be increased by reducing
the battery replacement cost significantly; 3) the BESS’s
charge/discharge limit serves as the limiting parameter for the
BESS’s revenue from ancillary services markets, which means
the BESSs with the same charge/discharge rate but different
capacities may collect the same revenue from the ancillary
services markets; 4) the increment of BESS’s revenue from
the energy market depends on the BESS’s capacity.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a bi-level optimization framework to
model the participation of a price-maker BESS in real-time
energy, reserve, and pay as performance regulation markets.
The proposed framework contains comprehensive models for
BESS operating limits and degradation costs, as well as ISO’s
joint market clearing details including AGC signal dispatch in
the frequency regulation market. This comprehensive frame-
work enables us to study the operating characteristics of BESS
across multiple markets and the impact of BESS’s profit
maximization activities on wholesale market outcomes. This
framework is validated using case studies on synthetic cases
built upon real-world scenarios. Interesting observations are
made from the simulation results.
Built upon this work, future research could focus on consid-
ering market uncertainties and renewable energy penetration
in the proposed framework for better evaluation of BESS’s
impact on energy and ancillary services markets.
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